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Recent Development
CANON 7 RESTRICTIONS ON THE POLITICAL SPEECH OF
JUDICIAL CANDIDATES: JUDGING THOSE WHO WOULD
BE JUDGES
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently
ruled on the constitutionality of Canon 7 of the Pennsylvania Code of
Judicial Conduct.' The Third Circuit narrowly construed the Code's
mandate that "[a] candidate . . .for a judicial office ...

should not...

announce his views on disputed legal or political issues ' 2 and vacated an
injunction granted by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania which precluded disciplinary action against the
plaintiff for violation of Canon 7.3
In Stretton v. Disciplinary Board,4 the Third Circuit first analyzed the
First Amendment issues presented,5 despite its acknowledgement of the
United States Supreme Court's "elementary rule" that courts, wherever
possible, should construe statutes so as to avoid a finding of unconstitutionality. 6 The court then predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would interpret Canon 7's prohibition of political speech as ex7
tending to "only those issues that are likely to come before the court."
1. See Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1991)
(finding that Canons 7(B)(l)(c) and 7(B)(2) did not violate First Amendment to
United States Constitution). For the relevant text of the challenged Canon 7
provisions, see infra note 2 and accompanying text, and note 10.
2. Code ofJudicial Conduct, 204 PA. CODE ch. 33, Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1979).
The quoted provision mirrors the language of Canon 7(B)(1)(c) of the American
Bar Association (ABA) Code of Judicial Conduct. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(l)(c) (1973). For further discussion of the ABA Code, see
infra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
3. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144. For a detailed discussion of the facts, prior
history and holding of Stretton, see infra notes 41-66 and accompanying text.

4. 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
5. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's First Amendment analysis in Stretton, see infra notes 58-61, 75-89 and accompanying text.

6. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144 (quoting EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (quoting

Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895))).
7. Id. The Stretton court was required to predict the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's response to the issue, because "[t]he meaning and construction of the
Code are matters of state law to be decided ultimately by the state Supreme
Court." Id. at 140. Before finding that the federal court should hear the case,

the Third Circuit acknowledged that "[t]he divergent readings by the parties
make it rather obvious that an authoritative ruling by [the state's supreme] court
would resolve or substantially narrow the area of conflict." Id. The court then
discussed Hughes v. Lipscher, 906 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1990), a New Jersey case

(139)
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Using this narrow formulation, the Third Circuit found that the Canon
did not unduly infringe the.plaintiff's First Amendment right to speak
freely on political issues8 and therefore upheld it as constitutional. 9
The Third Circuit continued to explore in its opinion the permissi-

bility of state restrictions on the political speech of judicial candidates,
finding that Canon 7 could, within the limits set by the Constitution,
prohibit the personal solicitation of funds for judicial campaigns.' 0
Therefore, the Stretton court affirmed the district court's order denying
plaintiff's requested injunction against enforcement of this provision of
Canon 7.11

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Canon 7 of the Code ofJudicial Conduct

"The Code ofJudicial Conduct, the product of almost three years of
work by the members and staff of the Special Committee on Standards
of Judicial Conduct, was adopted by unanimous vote of the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association [ABA] on August 16,
previously heard by the Third Circuit and similar to Stretton because it was also a
case in which the state supreme court could have mooted or changed the federal
analysis by subsequent interpretation of a state law issue. See Stretton, 944 F.2d at
140. Although abstention was appropriate in the Hughes case, "where no real
harm resulted from delay," the Stretton court found that its abstention in this
case would have resulted in harm to the plaintiff and other judicial candidates,
who would have been left without a definitive ruling as to the topics that could
be discussed within the ethical boundaries set by the Canon. Id. at 141. The
Stretton court stated:
In the absence of a ruling now, some judicial candidates may be
unwilling to risk disciplinary action and, instead, choose to impose unnecessarily rigid self-censorship on matters that are legitimate subjects
for discussion and appraisal by the electorate. That development
would constitute a harm to the public that could not be remedied by a
subsequent court decree.
Id.
For further discussion of the Third Circuit's narrow reading of Canon
7(B)(l)(c), see infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
8. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144. The Stretton court opined that the statute did
not "unnecessarily curtail protected speech, but [did] serve a compelling state
interest." Id. Therefore, the statute was not overbroad, and the plaintiff's First
Amendment challenges failed. Id. For a discussion of the Stretton court's First
Amendment analysis, see infra notes 58-61, 75-89 and accompanying text.
9. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142-44.
10. Id. at 146. Canon 7(B)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] candidate ...

for a judicial office . . . should not himself solicit or accept campaign

funds, or solicit publicly stated support .. " Code ofJudicial Conduct, 204 PA.
CODE ch. 33, Canon 7(B)(2) (1979). This language is identical to Canon 7(B)(2)
of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
7(B)(2) (1973). For a discussion of the ABA Code, see infra notes 12-22 and
accompanying text.
11. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 146.
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1972."12 The ABA sought "to reconcile the perceived need for an
elected judiciary with the general desire for a judiciary of unquestioned
integrity, independence, and impartiality" when it developed this code

of ethics, particularly Canon 7.13
In its preface to the Code, the ABA noted: "It is hoped that all
jurisdictions will adopt this Code and establish effective disciplinary procedures for its enforcement."'14 Forty-seven states have substantially
adopted the 1972 Code since its promulgation, and all but eleven of
these states have adopted Canon 7(B), which deals with the campaign
conduct ofjudges and of lawyers seeking judicial office.' 5 Pennsylvania
adopted all seven Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct in 1973, and
the Code went into effect in Pennsylvania on January 1, 1974.16
The Reporter's Notes to the Code of Judicial Conduct expanded
upon the meaning and purpose of Canon 7(B)'s restrictions on the political speech of judicial candidates:
What kind of campaign may the candidate for judicial office
conduct? He cannot campaign on a platform of partiality for
specific persons or groups, nor can he commit himself in advance on disputed legal issues ....The Committee was ... of
the opinion that a candidate should not base his campaign on
his view of the solutions to disputed political issues. He can
campaign [only] on the basis of his ability, experience, and
record. 17
12. E. WAYNE

THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

1

(1973).
13. James J. Alfini & TerrenceJ. Brooks, Ethical Constraintson JudicialElection
Campaigns: A Review and Critique of Canon 7, 77 Ky. L.J. 671, 672 (1988-1989).
Alfini and Brooks noted that this type of ethical restriction seeks to "control
judicial behavior during a political campaign in ways that will assure 1) faithfulness to the electoral process, and 2) judicial impartiality and the appearance of
impartiality." Id.
14. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preface (1973).
15. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 13, at 673, 675. Forty-two states currently
elect some part of their judiciary, and 35 of these jurisdictions use a process of
"merit selection and retention," known as the "Missouri plan," to select some of
theirjudges. Peter Cooke, Note, Breakstone v. MacKenzie: In a Case Where Fear
of Bias is Raised by JudicialElection Campaign Contributions, There Are No Clear Winners,
15 NOVA L. REV. 323, 339 (1991). For a general discussion of the "Missouri
plan," see Lawrence Baum, Voters' Information in Judicial Elections: The 1986 Contests for the Ohio Supreme Court, 77 Ky. L.J. 645, 645-47 & nn.1-7 (1988-1989).
The Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct require that all attorneys
comply with the restrictions imposed by Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct while they are candidates for judicial office. Rules of Professional Conduct,
204 PA. CODE § 81.4, Rule 8.2(c) (1988). This provision echoes the ABA Model
Rule which delineates a lawyer's duty to comply with Canon 7. See MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.2(b) (1983) ("A lawyer who is a candidate for

judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Code ofJudicial
Conduct.").
16. Code ofJudicial Conduct, 204 PA. CODE ch. 33, Canons 1-7 (1979).
17. THODE, supra note 12, at 98. The Committee recognized that in ajudi-
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The Reporter's Notes also discussed the judicial candidate's need to
raise campaign funds, noting that "[t]he problem of funding a campaign
for judicial office probably presents the greatest of all conflicts between
political necessity and judicial impartiality."1 8 The Committee chose to
prohibit personal solicitation by the candidate, while permitting solicitation by others on his or her behalf, hoping that this system would insulate the candidate from the direct influence of the contributor and stave
off the appearance of partiality.' 9
The Code seeks to guard against the appearance of personal bias
that detracts from the public image of the judge as one who will fairly
deliver the laws, because "[p]ublic confidence in the judiciary is a central
focus of the Judicial Code."' 20 One commentator has noted that
"[u]nderlying the Judicial Code's restrictions on campaign speech is the
view that judges should not engage in any extra-judicial activity that
would call into question their independence or impartiality." '2 '
Although he recognizes that public perception of bias is a valid concern,
the commentator nevertheless rejects this as a rationale for restricting a
candidate's speech, finding that even the goals of judicial independence
and impartiality are insufficient justification for an infringement of protected rights:
The stated rationale behind the ABA restriction on speech is
that it protects judicial impartiality and enhances the appearance of impartiality of judges. But there is no evidence that
free and open campaign debate diminishes judicial impartiality
or the appearance of impartiality. The rationale behind the
rule does not withstand scrutiny and cannot justify a restriction
22
on the exercise of activities protected by the first amendment.
cial campaign, "the tensions are obvious between the political elective process
and the desired ethical standards for thejudiciary." Id. Despite the ABA's goals
and the widespread adoption of Canon 7, evidence indicates that the Code's
"[e]thical restrictions on issue-oriented appeals to the voters are being flouted
with increasing frequency." Baum, supra note 15, at 670.
18. THODE, supra note 12, at 98.
19. Id. at 99. The former Canons ofJudicial Ethics had not authorized even
indirect contributions by lawyers to a judicial candidate's campaign fund. Id.
The modem Code ofJudicial Conduct requires that solicitation of funds be handled by a committee, places a time limit on the collection of funds, and prohibits
the use of these funds for the private benefit of the candidate or the candidate's
family. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2) (1973).
20. See Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionalityand Consequences of Restrictions on
Campaign Speech by Candidatesfor Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REV. 207, 212 (1987);

cf. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 13, at 671-72 ("Even if ajudge is able to maintain

his or her integrity and impartiality, will the judge's reputation still be open to
question and the public's confidence in the judiciary diminished?").
21. Snyder, supra note 20, at 212. Snyder notes that state courts often up-

hold disciplinary actions taken by bar agencies against judges whose acts off the
bench "reflect poorly on the judiciary. The practice even predates the Judicial
Code." Id. at 213 (footnote omitted).
22. Id. at 210 (footnote omitted). Snyder protests that "[i]n the course of

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss1/4

4

Sholette: Canon 7 Restrictions on the Political Speech of Judicial Candidat

1992]

RECENT DEVELOPMENT

Several courts have considered the application of Canon 7(B)(1)(c),
as adapted from the ABA Code ofJudicial Conduct, and have found the
ABA's restrictions on the political speech of judicial candidates unconstitutional. 2 3 For example, in ACLU v. Florida Bar,24 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida agreed with a judicial
candidate who alleged that Canon 7(B)(1)(c) was "so overbroad and/or
vague as to give no notice of the dividing line between fair comment and
impermissible speech."' 25 The Florida Bar court explained that while
promoting standards of conduct for members of the bar, the American Bar Association has established an unfortunate record of insensitivity to the constitutional rights of attorneys. . . . [Moreover, the ABA] has displayed a similar
disregard for the constitutional rights of attorneys and judges who seek elective
judicial office." Id. at 207-10 (footnotes omitted). He also notes that Canon
(7)(B) has "a number of flaws that prevent it from having a positive impact on
judicial impartiality." Id. at 229. As examples of the Canon's flaws, Snyder
highlights the rule's underinclusiveness, noting its failure to similarly restrict the
speech of candidates for appointive judicial office, its limited scope, as it prohibits only one type of public statement, and its failure to consider "numerous
other types of public pronouncements that may have equal or greater impact on
judicial impartiality." Id. at 229-30. Snyder also points to Canon 7's overbreadth as a flaw, as it restricts too large a category of political speech. Id. at
233.
Additionally, Snyder raises the interesting point that American judges have
historically discussed and debated the public issues of the day. Id. at 232. He
stresses that "Supreme Court Justices have a long tradition of expressing views
on legal and political issues." Id. This view contradicts the "tradition" described by one Newsweek reporter, who suggested that then-Judge Clarence
Thomas, nominee to the Supreme Court, should voice the "traditional view that
he shouldn't prejudge controversial topics that might come before him on the
high court" in order to dodge tough questions at his confirmation hearings.
Aric Press with Bob Cohn, Hearing But Not Speaking, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 16, 1991,
at 18, 23. Another Newsweek reporter, however, captured the sentiments of
many Americans regarding the nominee's anticipated silence on controversial
issues, asserting that although the Judge might choose to reveal little, "it is the
duty of a justice to take a stand on society's most vexing questions." David A.
Kaplan et al., Supreme Mystery, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 16, 1991, at 31 (emphasis
added).
23. See, e.g., Beshear v. Butt, 773 F. Supp. 1229, 1233 (E.D. Ark. 1991)
(finding Canon 7(B)(l)(c) vague and substantially overbroad on its face and as
applied to plaintiff); ACLU v. Florida Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1098 (N.D. Fla.
1990) (finding Canon 7(B)(1)(c) was not least restrictive means of achieving
state interest); J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Ky.) (finding Canon
7(B)(1)(c) insufficiently narrowly drawn), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 70 (1991). For a
discussion of Florida Bar, see infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. For a
discussion ofJ.C.J.D., see infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
24. 744 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990).
25. Id. at 1096; accord Beshear, 773 F. Supp. at 1233 ("[A] judicial candidate
striving diligently to conduct a campaign that is consistent with the canon, without the benefit of any specific standards as a guide, would in all likelihood refrain from expressing ... [even constitutionally protected] views ....").
A statute will be struck down as overbroad when a court finds that the statute has a real and substantial "chilling" effect on the exercise of a protected
right. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). In Broadrick, the
Court explained that the overbreadth doctrine permits constitutional challenges
to statutes based on "a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very
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"obedience to the profession's ethical precepts may require abstention
from what in other circumstances would be constitutionally protected
behavior ....

Nevertheless, a person does not surrender his constitu-

tional right to freedom of speech when he becomes a candidate for judicial office. A state cannot require so much." '2 6 The court held that the
Canon's prohibitions went too far in restricting speech, and therefore,
the presumption of unconstitutionality raised by the Canon's broad lan27
guage could not be overcome.
InJ.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R.,28 the Kentucky Supreme Court also stressed
a judicial candidate's right to free speech. 29 This case involved a candidate who was "discussing opinions that he ha[d] authored, criticizing his
opponent's position on legal issues, and explaining to the public his judicial philosophy." 3 0° Although the Kentucky court recognized that the
state had a compelling interest in enforcing the Canon, it nevertheless
found that the Canon's prohibitions were overbroad:
There can be no question that the state has a compelling
interest to protect and preserve the integrity and objectivity of
the judicial system ....
[J]udicial candidates [cannot] be allowed to make promises or predispositions of cases or issues
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." Id. at 612. The statute at issue in Broadrick was
modeled after the Hatch Act, which prohibited political solicitation by civil servants. See id. at 602, 604; Bauers v. Cornett, 865 F.2d 1517, 1522 (8th Cir.
1989). The Hatch Act, however, was subsequently amended by Congress, narrowing its restriction on the political activities of state and local employees and
prohibiting civil servants only from running for elective office or using official
authority to influence the election process or to coerce other employees. Bauers,
865 F.2d at 1523-24. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
recently interpreted the Hatch Act to apply only to political activity of a partisan
nature. Id. at 1524.
26. Florida Bar, 744 F. Supp. at 1097.
27. See id. ("A court must strictly scrutinize such a regulation, requiring the
state to bear the burden of showing that its regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.")
(citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)). In Florida Bar, the court found
that the Canon did "more than proscribe untruthful or deceptive announcements, or announcements concerning specific cases, or announcements which
might be construed as particularized pledges of conduct," and implied that such
lesser restrictions may have fallen within the bounds set by the First Amendment. Id. at 1097-98.
28. 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 70 (1991).
29. See id. at 954-55. InJ.C.J.D., the Kentucky court stated: "Freedom of
speech extends to a candidate for public office, including judicial offices. 'The
candidate, no less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to engage
in the discussion of public issues ...... Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976)).
30. Id. at 955-56. The court noted that the Canon "strictly prohibit[ed]
dialogue on virtually every issue that would be of interest to the voting public."
Id. at 956.
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that are likely to come before the courts that might reflect upon
a judge's impartiality.
However... Canon 7(B)(1)(c) is not so narrowly drawn as
to limit a candidate's speech to such specific prohibitions. Instead, the section prohibits all discussion of a judicial candidate's views on disputed legal or political issues, and thus
unnecessarily violates fundamental state and federal constitu3t
tional free speech rights of judicial candidates.
After finding that Canon 7(B)(1)(c) violated both the state and federal constitutions, theJC.J.D. court suggested that a narrower wording
of the statute would have allowed it to pass constitutional muster.3 2 In
31. Id. (citation omitted). TheJ.C.J.D. court also opined that the "rights of
the voting public to hear what a candidate has to say" are compelling. Id.; see also
Snyder, supra note 20, at 215-16. Snyder comments that restrictions on the campaign speech of judicial candidates violates the First Amendment by
substantially limit[ing] the availability to the electorate of information
about candidates for judicial office. In so doing, the rule violates a central purpose of the first amendment's protection for speech: to assure
the free flow of information about government officials to the voters
who select them ....
In matters of governmental affairs, free speech is necessary to assure that the public's business is being conducted properly ....
Freedom of speech serves a special function in a system of government in which those who govern are chosen by the electorate. Freedom to express views is necessary if the public is to make fair
judgments among the candidates who seek office.
Snyder, supra note 20, at 210, 215-16 (footnotes omitted); cf Alfini & Brooks,
supra note 13, at 719 (as a result of Canon 7, "the electorate has inadequate
information to judge the judges"). But cf. Robert S. Thompson,JudicialIndependence, JudicialAccountability,Judicial Elections, and the CaliforniaSupreme Court: Defining the Terms of the Debate, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 830 (1986) ("[Ilmpartiality
should be protected against anything which threatens it, including the pressure
of an election.").
32. J.C.J.D., 803 S.W.2d at 956. The Kentucky court found that "[t]o specifically prohibit ... campaign conduct [suggesting partiality] and avoid constitutional concerns, this Canon provision can be rewritten in a much narrower
scope to outlaw discussion of pending or future litigation." Id. As an illustration, the court discussed a 1990 change in the ABA's Model Code. Id. This
modification narrowed the scope of Canon 7(B)(l)(c) to restrict only "stated
personal views on issues that may come before the Court," because the Canon
as originally written was an "overly broad restriction on speech." Id. (citing
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (August 1990)). But see Snyder, supra note

20, at 234. Snyder maintains that
[elven if the ABA prohibition on campaign speech were limited to
statements casting doubt on the judge's impartiality in cases likely to
come before her, the rule would be improper. The arguments in favor
ofjudicial campaign restrictions on speech are based upon logic rather
than history. There is no historical evidence to support a claim that
when judicial candidates have spoken out on disputed issues, their impartiality has suffered.
Id.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, in a
case decided afterJ.C.J.D., considered a canon provision that prevented a judi-
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fact, a narrower reading of Canon 7(B)(1)(c) has been used by other
courts to render the provision constitutional.33
Berger v. Supreme Court of Ohio3 4 provides an example of a narrower
construction of Canon 7(B)(1)(c). In Berger, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that the plaintiff's interpretation of the Canon as forbidding him to criticize the incumbent,
pledge judicial reform or "publicly state anything other than that he will
faithfully and impartially perform the duties of the office" was incorrect.3 5 Despite the judicial candidate's challenge that the uncertain
scope of the rule produced a chilling effect on his freedom of speech,
cial candidate from making "statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come
before the court." Ackerson v. Kentucky Judicial Retirement & Removal
Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 311 (W.D. Ky. 1991). The Ackerson court found that
the canon was unconstitutionally overbroad in its restriction of the candidate's
pledges, promises and commitments regarding issues of court administration,
and held that any disciplinary action against the candidate for discussion of these
issues should be enjoined. Id. at 313-16. The Ackerson court noted, however,
that "[i]mpartiality is an attribute of the exercise of a court's adjudicatory power,
not its administrative function." Id. at 314. The court used this distinction to
hold constitutional the canon's prohibition against campaign statements that
commit the candidate with respect to adjudicatory issues likely to come before
the court. Id. at 314-15. The Western District of Kentucky also noted that this
canon provision was not impermissibly vague, nor did it prohibit the candidate
from speaking about legal issues:
A candidate may fully discuss, debate, and commit himself with respect
to legal issues which are unlikely to come before the court. A candidate
may also fully discuss and debate legal issues which are likely to come
before the court. It is only with respect to the latter that the candidate
is prohibited from making direct or indirect commitments.
Id. at 315.
33. See, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991) (Canon 7(B)(l)(c) construed to prohibit discussion of only those issues likely to
come before court); Berger v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 598 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.
Ohio 1984) (state may constitutionally prohibit announcement of "predetermined views on disputed legal or political issues" or promises of specific conduct or programs while in judicial office), aff'd without opinion, 869 F.2d 719 (6th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1108 (1989); see also In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392
(Wash. 1988) (en banc) (state may prohibit pledges of specific conduct with regard to particular group of defendants). For a discussion of Stretton, see infra
notes 57-66 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Berger, see infra notes
34-36 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Kaiser, see infra notes 37-40
and accompanying text.
34. 598 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984), aff'd without opinion, 869 F.2d 719
(6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1108 (1989).
35. Id. at 72, 75. The plaintiff in Berger also contended that the Canon's
application solely to the state's judicial candidates, and not to candidates for
legislative or executive positions, made the provision arbitrary and violative of
his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the laws. Id. at 72.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio rejected this
challenge, stating that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood
that the Canon's restriction of only judicial candidates represented a denial of
his right to equal protection. Id. at 76. The court found that "[t]he very purpose of the judicial function makes inappropriate the same kind of particularized
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the court found that "even under a standard of strict scrutiny, the state's
36
regulation [was] necessary to achieve a compelling state interest."
In re Kaiser3 7 provides another example of a court's narrow reading
of Canon 7(B)(1)(c). In this 1988 case, the Washington Supreme Court
found that the Canon's restrictions on judicial campaign promises could
have met constitutional muster "if they [were] construed to permit a
broad range of fair comment on judicial qualifications." ' 38 In Kaiser, the
court opined that the judicial candidate was entitled to announce that he
would be a "tough, no-nonsense judge," as part of his qualifications, but
the state could constitutionally forbid him from stating that he would be
"tough" on a particular group of defendants.3 9 The court justified
Canon 7(B)(1)(c)'s restriction by noting that "[t]he State's interest in
protecting the good reputation of the judiciary is compelling, as every
40
court which considers the issue has recognized."
B.

Stretton v. Disciplinary Board

In 1991, Pennsylvania attorney Samuel C. Stretton, a candidate for
judge of the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, filed a civil rights
action challenging two provisions of Canon 7 of the Pennsylvania Code
of Judicial Conduct as abridging his First Amendment rights to speak
41
out on political issues and personally to raise funds for his campaign.
In Stretton v. Disciplinary Board,42 the United States District Court for the

pledges and predetermined commitments that mark campaigns for legislative
and executive office. Ajudge acts on individual cases, not broad programs." Id.
36. Id. at 75. The Berger court continued: "The Court finds that plaintiff
has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood that these [compelling state] interests are outweighed by whatever intrusion on the First Amendment is caused by
prohibiting judicial candidates from making misleading or fallacious statements
or political pledges." Id. at 76. The court used the "substantial likelihood"
standard because the plaintiff was seeking preliminary injunctive relief against
enforcement of the statute, and a court may not grant such relief unless a "substantial likelihood" exists that the plaintiff's case will succeed on the merits. See
id. at 74. As in Berger, the plaintiff in Stretton was also seeking injunctive relief.
Stretton, 944 F.2d at 139.
37. 759 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1988) (en banc).
38. Id. at 400 (citing In re Baker, 542 P.2d 701 (Kan. 1975)).
39. Id. at 396. The judge's pledge to be particularly "tough" on drunk
drivers revealed a bias that he intended to maintain while sitting on the bench,
regardless of the facts of the individual case before him. Id. This bias was "exactly the opposite" of the impartiality that Canon 7(B)(l)(c) seeks to safeguard.
Id.

40. Id. at 399. The Kaiser court found that because judges "often are called
upon to adjudicate cases squarely presenting hotly contested social or political
issues[,] [t]he state's interest in ensuring that judges be and appear to be neither
antagonistic nor beholden to any interest, party, or person is entitled to the
greatest respect." Id. at 399-400 (quoting Morial v.Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d
295, 302 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978)).
41. Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 763 F. Supp. 128, 129-30 (E.D. Pa.), aff'din
part, vacated in part, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
42. Id.
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that Canon 7(B)(1)(c), which prohibits judicial candidates from announcing their views on "disputed"
legal or political issues, 43 had an impermissible, "chilling" effect on the
speech of the plaintiff and potentially on the speech of other judicial
candidates. 4 4 Furthermore, the court found that the Canon was overbroad and unconstitutionally vague. 45 Therefore, the district court
granted the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief against the Canon's
enforcement. 4 6 The court, however, found unpersuasive the plaintiff's
argument that Canon 7(B)(2)'s restriction on ajudicial candidate's ability personally to solicit funds for his or her campaign was overbroad,
and therefore, the court denied plaintiff's request for an injunction
47
against enforcement of this provision.
Stretton's main contention was that the Canon's prohibition on the
discussion of disputed issues in his judicial campaign rendered him "unable to participate meaningfully in the judicial election . . .and [thus,]

the public [was] deprived of the means by which to evaluate the ability of
competing candidates." '4 8 He wanted to address publicly certain legal
and political issues, such as the party affiliations ofjudges, the right to
privacy and his own philosophical views on criminal sentencing, the
rights of victims and the "reasonable doubt" standard. 49
43. For the relevant text of Canon 7(B)(l)(c), see supra text accompanying
note 2.
44. Stretton, 763 F. Supp. at 130-32. For a discussion of the chilling effect of
overbroad legislation on speech, see supra note 25.
45. Stretton, 763 F. Supp. at 139. The district court found that Canon
7(B)(1)(c) gave no notice of what speech was prohibited by the phrase "disputed
legal or political issues." Id. The Code ofJudicial Conduct allows judicial candidates "to speak at political gatherings on their own behalf 'insofar as permitted
by law,' " but places the burden upon the candidate to discover exactly what the
law permits. Id. (quoting CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(2) (1973)).
Therefore, the court concluded that such "guesswork as to what constitutes permissible campaign speech is simply not permissible in the context of core First
Amendment freedoms such as are at issue here." Id.
46. Id. The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of Canon
7(B)(l)(c), finding that it violated the First Amendment by "den[ying] judicial
candidates the right to engage in debate of issues of great public concern." Id.
47. Id. at 139-40. The court noted that Canon 7(B)(2) "does not restrict
expenditures or contributions, nor does it set a limit on the amount or on who
can contribute or receive it." Id. at 139. Rather, the court found that "it is only
the narrowest possible restriction" and stressed that "[t]here is no less restrictive method to remove a judicial candidate from direct influence by the source
and the amount of campaign contributions." Id. at 139-40.
48. Id. at 130.
49. Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 139 (3d Cir. 1991); Stretton,
763 F. Supp. at 131. The Third Circuit characterized the topics plaintiff wished
to discuss as follows:
Plaintiff alleged that he wished to protest the fact that currently in the
county the Common Pleas judges are all Republicans, a departure from
the bipartisan tradition that prevailed until the late 1950s. In addition,
he desired to "announce his views" on the following issues:
(a) the need for the election ofjudges with an "activist" view, and the
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At the hearing on the motion for preliminary and permanent injunction, 50 the Chief Counsel for the defendant Disciplinary Board and
the Executive Director and General Counsel for the defendant Judicial
Inquiry and Review Board 5 1 testified for the defendants that a judicial
candidate's discussion of the topics delineated by the plaintiff would not
violate the Canon as they understood it. 5 2 According to the Boards, the
Canon should be interpreted narrowly, prohibiting discussion of only
those issues that might come before the court. 53 The Counselors, however, admitted that their opinions would not bind any current or future
Boards. 54 Therefore, the district court opined that the Boards' statements failed to alleviate the uncertainty facing judicial candidates or the
obligation ofjudges at every level of the judicial system to look at societal changes when ruling on challenges to existing law;
(b) criminal sentencing and the rights of victims of crime;
(c) "reasonable doubt" and how he would apply that standard as an
elected judge;
(d) the need to more closely scrutinize the work of district judges...
particularly in light of the removal of several such justices in recent
years because of improper conduct;
(e) the need for various changes in judicial administration including
the jury selection process (so that panels more accurately reflect the
county's racial composition);
(0 the need for greater sensitivity toward hiring minority lawyers and
law clerks, especially by the county's judges and district attorney;
(g) plaintiff's qualifications and those of his opponents as well as a perceived need for a woman judge; and
(h) the importance of the right to privacy as a basic constitutional right.
Stretton, 944 F.2d at 139.
50. The two hearings were consolidated at the district court level. See Stretton, 944 F.2d at 139.
51. The Disciplinary Board for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the
Judicial Inquiry and Review Board are the administrative bodies responsible for
enforcing the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct and the Pennsylvania
Code ofJudicial Conduct, respectively. Stretton, 763 F. Supp. at 130. The Chief
Counsel of the Disciplinary Board, Robert H. Davis, Jr., was also named as a
defendant. Id. at 130.
52. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 139.
53. Stretton, 763 F. Supp. at 132. The defendants-appellees requested a
construction that "limit[ed] Canon 7's prohibition to speech that exhibits partiality toward possible future adjudications." Stretton, 944 F.2d at 140 (citing Appellee Brief at 38). Thus, the defendants attempted to equate the restriction of
speech concerning "disputed legal or political issues" with restrictions designed
both to avoid prejudging of legal and political issues and to avoid a public perception of promises to support certain policies when cases related to such policies came before the bench. Id. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania court,
however, found that the defendants' construction of the Canon's language was
inconsistent with at least one current investigation that the Disciplinary Board
was conducting and stated that this narrow reading of Canon 7(B)(1)(c) was "a
strained and tortuous interpretation that is not credible and not one that ajudicial candidate can rely upon." Stretton, 763 F. Supp. at 132-33. But see Stretton,
944 F.2d at 143 (Disciplinary Board's termination of above-mentioned investigation and subsequent reiteration of narrow construction of Canon 7(B)(1)(c) dispelled inference of inconsistency).
54. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142-43. The Boards predicted that plaintiff's pro-
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consequent chilling effect on their political speech. 55 The district court
further expounded on the lack of adequate guidelines for judicial candidates, stating that
neither... [Board] issues regulations or advisory opinions such
that might give assurance to plaintiff that he will not be investigated in the future. . . . (Additionally], neither . . . Board is
aware of any judicial opinions, administrative guideline, standards, writings or any other authority of any kind supporting
the "narrow construction" of the Canon which defendants have
56
urged here.
The Third Circuit, however, was a more receptive audience for the
defendants' narrow reading of Canon 7(B)(1)(c) than was the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. 57 The Third Circuit applied United States
Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence to Stretton, addressing
such issues as (1) a state's interest in regulating the speech of judicial
candidates, 58 (2) the overbreadth doctrine as it applies to Canon
7(B)(1)(c), 5 9 and (3) the application of the "narrowly tailored" requirement in this case. 60 Using this First Amendment analysis, the Third Cirposed topics would not violate Canon 7(B)(l)(c), but only the state supreme
court can definitively interpret a state's Code of Judicial Conduct. Id. at 140.
55. Stretton, 763 F. Supp. at 132; cf. Ackerson v. Kentucky Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 312 (W.D. Ky. 1991) ("[A judicial
candidate] is not required to choose between limiting his campaign speech or
taking his chances with [a disciplinary] Commission where ...

a real possibility

exists that sanctions will be sought."). The Eastern District of Pennsylvania
court noted that the plaintiff's speech had already been chilled by the Canon's
vague prohibition, because he had instructed a newspaper not to print his opinion regarding the impact of a Supreme Court decision, in case his comments
violated the Canon. Stretton, 763 F. Supp. at 132. The district court indicated
that the Boards' opinions on the plaintiff's topics would fail to cure this unconstitutional overbreadth for four reasons: 1) the plaintiff had not agreed to limit
his speech to those topics the Boards had considered; 2) the Boards' current
Counselors could not bind the Boards nor their successors to their current interpretation of the Canon; 3) neither Board issued regulations or advisory opinions that could assure the plaintiff that he would not be investigated for his
statements in the future; and 4) neither Board could suggest any judicial opinion, administrative guideline or any other authority which supported the narrow
construction of Canon 7 proposed by the Boards in Stretton. Id.
56. Stretton, 763 F. Supp. at 132.
57. See Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142-44.
58. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of a state's interest in
regulating the speech ofjudicial candidates, see infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
59. For a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine, see supra note 25. For a
discussion of the overbreadth doctrine's application in Stretton, see infra notes
81-89 and accompanying text.
60. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 141-44. For a discussion of the narrowly tailored
requirement as applied to Canon 7(B)(1)(c) in Stretton, see infra notes 81-89 and
accompanying text.
First Amendment rights, including freedom of speech, are deemed to be in
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cuit found that the defendants' narrow construction of Canon 7(B)(1)(c)
could be used to bring the Code provision within the constitutional
mandate. 6 1 The Third Circuit then predicted that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would choose to adopt this constitutional construction
of the Canon, rather than striking down the Canon as an overly broad
restriction of a judicial candidate's right to speak freely on political
62
issues.
The Third Circuit, however, agreed with the district court's conclusion that Canon 7(B)(2)'s prohibition of the personal solicitation of campaign contributions by judicial candidates was both appropriate and
constitutional. 63 The Third Circuit noted that a judicial candidate's pera "preferred position" in relation to other constitutional guarantees. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). Additionally, the Supreme
Court has noted that "[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation" of our system of government
and are afforded the broadest protection under the First Amendment. Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1975) (citizens must be able to make informed
choices among candidates for office so there will be "unfettered interchange of
ideas," promoting social and political change) (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
In order to maintain First Amendment rights in their preferred position, the
Supreme Court has held that where a state chooses to infringe upon such "fundamental" rights, the government must produce a rule which is "precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
217 (1982). Additionally, the government must prove that other, less burdensome means of accomplishing its goal are not practical alternatives to the
method it has chosen. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). In
other words, the state must prove that the means chosen were "narrowly tailored" to serve the identified state interest. See id.
61. See Stretton, 944 F.2d at 141-44. For a detailed discussion of the Third
Circuit's First Amendment analysis, see infra notes 69-80 and accompanying
text.
62. See Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's
prediction regarding the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's analysis of Canon 7, see
infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
63. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 146; cf. In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 40 (Or. 1990).
In Fadeley, the Oregon Supreme Court held that a prohibition of personal solicitation was not unconstitutional because the state's interest in judicial integrity
and the appearance ofjudicial integrity outweighs a judicial candidate's right to
free expression. Fadeley, 802 F.2d at 40. The state's interest in avoiding the
appearance of impropriety was described by the Oregon Supreme Court as follows: "The stake of the public in ajudicary that is both honest in fact and honest
in appearance is profound. [Our] society ... leaves many of its final decisions,
both constitutional and otherwise, to its judiciary [and] is totally dependent on
the scrupulous integrity of that judiciary." Id.
In Stretton, the plaintiff maintained that prohibiting him from personally
soliciting contributions would drastically reduce his funding by cutting off the
"most effective means" of raising campaign funds. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 146.
The plaintiff relied on Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975). Id. at 145. In Buckky, the United States Supreme Court found that limitations on campaign contributions imposed "substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the
quality and diversity of political speech." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. The Third
Circuit, however, responded to Stretton's argument by finding that the state's
interest in preventing a public perception ofjudges as partial to those who con-
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sonal role in fundraising would "lend[] itself to the appearance of coercion or expectation of impermissible favoritism." '64 Because Canon 7
provides for alternative methods of raising funds, 65 the Third Circuit
found that the provision was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling
state interest of prohibiting behavior from which a strong inference of
66
judicial impropriety might arise.
III.

DISCUSSION

The Stretton court found that the issue regarding the constitutionality of Canon 7(B)(1)(c) was not moot, despite the Boards' assertion that
the topics proposed by the plaintiff for public discussion would not violate the Code provisions. 6 7 Moreover, although "[tihe meaning and
construction of the Code are matters of state law to be decided ultimately by the state Supreme Court," the Third Circuit decided not to
abstain from hearing this case, largely because of the "potential impact
68
on the parties caused by delay in obtaining a state ruling.",
The Third Circuit commenced its First Amendment discussion with
an overview of United States Supreme Court decisions regarding the
fundamental right to free political speech and permissible governmental
restrictions on such speech. 69 The Third Circuit noted that "[sipeech
uttered as part of a campaign for public office directly and unmistakably
invokes the protection of the First Amendment." ' 70 The court added,
tribute to their campaigns is compelling and that the means used in Canon
7(B)(2) to combat this problem are sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive a
strict scrutiny analysis. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 145-46.
64. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 146. For example, in In re Hotchkiss, 327 N.W.2d

312 (Mich. 1982), the Michigan Supreme Court found that ajudicial candidate's
personal solicitation of a campaign contribution warranted a written public reprimand, even though the candidate for reelection had specifically told the contributing attorney that the aid would have no effect on the outcome of cases
currently pending before him. Id. at 312-13.
65. Canon 7 permits a candidate to "establish committees of responsible
persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for his campaign and to
obtain public statements of support for his candidacy. Such committees are not
prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions and public support from lawyers." Code ofJudicial Conduct, 204 PA. CODE ch. 33, Canon 7(B)(2) (1990).
66. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 146. The Third Circuit implied that personal solicitation by judicial candidates might be the most effective method of fundraising
precisely because it creates expectations of favoritism among contributors. See
id.
67. Id. at 140. The Third Circuit noted that the Boards were not the final
interpreters of the Code and that the overbreadth challenge was sufficient in
itself to sustain the litigation. Id.
68. Id. The Third Circuit's abstention analysis in Stretton varied from its
previous analysis of a similar issue in Hughes v. Lipscher, 906 F.2d 961 (3d Cir.
1990), where the court abstained from deciding a state law issue. Stretton, 944
F.2d at 140-41. For a comparison of Stretton and Hughes, see supra note 7.
69. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 141-42. For a discussion of the Supreme Court
cases considered by the Stretton court, see infra notes 70-72.
70. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 141 (quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Demo-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss1/4

14

Sholette: Canon 7 Restrictions on the Political Speech of Judicial Candidat

1992]

RECENT DEVELOPMENT

however, that "freedom of political discussion is not absolute." '7 1
The Stretton court then employed a strict scrutiny test that balanced
"the interests of the individual to comment on matters of public interest
and the governmental interest." 7 2 The court noted that in order to
overcome an individual's fundamental right to speak freely on political
matters, the government must demonstrate a compelling state interest
that is to be served by the restrictions on such speech. 7" Additionally,
the government must prove that the restrictions it has imposed have
been narrowly tailored to achieve that state interest, while interfering as
74
little as possible with a citizen's fundamental right.
The Stretton court commenced its First Amendment analysis with a
discussion of the state interest involved in restricting the speech ofjudicial candidates. 75 Although the Third Circuit recognized that limits on a
state's power to regulate public debate in a political setting exist, it
noted that "[t]here can be no question ... that a state has a compelling
interest in the integrity of its judiciary.' 7 6 Moreover, the court recognized a state interest in protecting the judicial process from being misjudged by the public as unfair or biased. 7 7 The court expanded on this
cratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)). In Eu, the Supreme Court affirmed a Ninth Circuit holding that a California Code provision heavily
restricting the speech of political parties was unconstitutional. Eu, 489 U.S. at
216. The challenged code provision restricted the political parties' public activities and internal affairs and violated the Constitution by directly affecting speech
"at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms." Id.
at 222-23 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)). The Eu Court
noted that "the First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to
speech uttered during a campaign for political office." Id. at 223 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
71. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 141. The Third Circuit discussed United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), a
case in which the plaintiff sought to invalidate the statutory ban on campaigning
by federal employees. See Stretton, 944 F.2d at 141. The Letter Carriers Court
explained that the aim of the Hatch Act, which prevented federal employees
from playing major roles in political elections, was to preserve confidence in the
political system by safeguarding the appearance of a fair and impartial execution
of the laws. See Letter Carriers,413 U.S. at 565. The Court upheld these restrictions on political speech, finding that "[n]either the right to associate nor the
right to participate in political activities is absolute in any event ....Nor are the

management, financing, and conduct of political campaigns wholly free from
government regulation." Id. at 567.
72. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 141 (citing United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v.
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973)). For a discussion of
the strict scrutiny test, see supra notes 27 & 60 and cases cited supra note 25. For
a discussion of the strict scrutiny test as applied in Stretton, see infra text accompanying notes 75-89.
73. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 141-42 (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53
(1982)).
74. Id. (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53 (1982)).
75. Id. at 142.
76. Id.

77. Id. (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 565 (1965)); see also Ackerson
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idea, stating that while it is important that governmental employees "in
fact avoid practicing political justice ... it is also critical that they appear
to the public to be avoiding it." 7 8 Considering the interest noted above,
the Stretton court stated:
It requires no extended discussion to demonstrate that
Pennsylvania's canon serves this interest. Ifjudicial candidates
during a campaign prejudge cases that later come before them,
the concept of impartial justice becomes a mockery. The ideal
of an adjudication reached after a fair hearing . . .no longer
would apply and the confidence of the public in the rule of law
79
would be undermined.
v. Kentucky Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 315
(W.D. Ky. 1991) ("[T]here is a compelling state interest in ...limiting a judicial
candidate's speech, because the making of campaign commitments on issues
likely to come before the court tends to undermine the fundamental fairness and
impartiality of the legal system."). In Cox, the United States Supreme Court held
that a state could constitutionally bar picketing outside a courthouse, because
the state's interest in averting the appearance of improper influence of judges
outweighed the protestors' First Amendment rights. Cox, 379 U.S. at 564-65.
The Court opined that "[a] State may protect against the possibility of a conclusion by the public... [that a] judge's action was in part a product of intimidation
[due to picketing] and did not flow only from the fair and orderly working of the
judicial process." Id.at 565.
78. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 141 (quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v.
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)). One commentator
has noted that "[a] fair trial is the foundation of our judicial system and is protected by the United States Constitution's due process provisions. Congress has
determined that a trial must be fair in both fact and appearance." Ann Marie
Janus, Recent Decision, Judicial Disqualificationfor Appearance of Bias-Jenkins v.
Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1988), 62 TEMP. L. REv. 1075, 1076 (1989)
(citation omitted).
79. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142. The Third Circuit continued:
The functioning of the judicial system differs markedly from those
of the executive and legislative. In those areas, the public has the right
to know the details of the programs that candidates propose to enact
into law and administer. Pledges to follow certain paths are not only
expected, but are desirable . . . . By contrast, the judicial system is
based on the concept of individualized decisions on challenged conduct
and interpretations of law enacted by the other branches of
government.
Id.; cf Ackerson v. Kentucky Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 776 F.
Supp. 309, 313 (W.D. Ky. 1991) ("While candidates for elective judicial office
are not without the protection of the First Amendment, their campaign conduct
has been regulated to a greater degree than [that of] non-judicial candidates.").
The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky recently
discussed the appearance of bias and partiality which might arise from unrestricted judicial campaign speech:
All candidates for elective office, including judicial candidates, presumably come equipped with opinions and predilections which are the result of their life experience. A judge, however, must cast these aside,
saving only his or her intrinsic notion of fundamental fairness. ...
[P]re-election commitments by judicial candidates impair the integrity
of the court by making the candidate appear to have pre-judged an is-
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Therefore, the court found that Canon 7 served a compelling govern80
mental interest and thus passed the first part of the strict scrutiny test.
The Third Circuit then examined the Canon's restriction of legal
and political speech to determine whether it was narrowly tailored so as
to refrain from excessive circumscription of protected speech. 8 ' In
Stretton, the parties offered their own interpretations of the disputed
Code provision; the defendants' reading of Canon 7 (B) (1)(c) would have
been sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass the strict scrutiny test, while
the plaintiff's interpretation would have rendered the Canon
82
unconstitutional.
The Boards' interpretation of the Canon was sufficiently narrow to
pass constitutional muster, protecting a plaintiff's right to speak on
some controversial political and legal issues, while prohibiting discussion of issues likely to come before the bench. 83 The district court had
rejected this position, finding that the Boards' current interpretation of
Canon 7 was not binding on any current or future Boards. 8 4 The Third
Circuit, however, found that the Boards' construction was entitled to
consideration, because the Boards would be bound by the restrictive interpretation of Canon 7 that they had proposed after offering it in both
the district court and the court of appeals.8 5 Moreover, the Third Circuit found that a Counselor's recommendations could influence the Jusue without benefit of argument of counsel, applicable law, and the particular facts in each case.
Ackerson, 776 F. Supp. at 315.
80. See Ackerson, 776 F. Supp. at 315. For a discussion of the strict scrutiny
test, see supra notes 27 & 60, notes 72-74 and accompanying text, and cases cited
supra note 25.
81. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142. For a discussion of the narrowly tailored requirement, see supra notes 27 & 60, and text accompanying note 74.
82. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142-43. The Third Circuit noted that the plaintiff
presented a broad and literal interpretation of the Canon and therefore requested that it be struck down as overbroad. Id. at 143. In an interesting aside,
the Third Circuit noted that "although not unknown, it is a somewhat curious
situation when the agency charged with enforcement argues for less authority
and its opponent would foist unwanted power on the government." Id.; accord
Plumstead Township Civic Ass'n v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 597 A.2d
734, 736 n.7 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (quoting Stretton). For a detailed discussion
of the Boards' interpretation of the Canon, see supra notes 50-53, and infra notes
83-87 and accompanying text.
83. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142-43. In both the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit, the Counselors for the Boards maintained that
public announcement of the plaintiff's views regarding a proposed list of topics,
including his opinions on judicial activism, the rights of crime victims and
needed changes in judicial administration, would not violate Canon 7. Id. at
139, 142. For the complete list of plaintiff's proposed topics of discussion, see
supra note 49.
84. Stretton, 763 F. Supp. at 132-33. For a discussion of the district court's
consideration of the Boards' argument, see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying
text.
85. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 143. The Third Circuit explained: "Having
adopted the position in litigation that the Canon is to be interpreted narrowly,
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dicial Inquiry Review Board, which in turn could recommend actions to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 86 Therefore, the Third Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion and held that the current Boards'
87
interpretation of Canon 7 was entitled to some weight.
The Third Circuit found that the Boards' narrow construction of
Canon 7 was consistent with other provisions of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, for example Canon 4, which "permits judges to write and
speak about the law, the legal system and the administration of justice."' 88 Additionally, prohibiting a candidate's announcement of his or
her opinion on issues truly in dispute (in other words, those likely to be
pending in the courts), would reasonably serve the state's interest in
avoiding the appearance of partiality and fostering the appearance of
89
open and impartial minds within the judiciary.
After determining the constitutionally permissible level of state interference with a judicial candidate's political speech, the Stretton court
emphasized that courts, wherever possible, should interpret statutes so
as to avoid constitutional difficulties. 90 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has similarly followed this guideline. 9 1 The Third Circuit therefore opined that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would also have
adopted the Boards' restrictive interpretation of Canon 7(B)(1)(c), for
that interpretation could create a Code provision that "does not unnecthe Boards are barred from returning to court and adopting a contrary position." Id. (citing Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., 903 F.2d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 1990)).
86. Id. The Third Circuit described the recommendation process as
follows:
In Pennsylvania the definitive construction of the Canon is that put
upon it by the state Supreme Court, but we would be naive not to recognize that the Judicial Inquiry [and] Review Board's position is, at the
very least, a straw in the wind indicating the direction that court will go.
The role of Counsel to the Judicial Inquiry [and Review] Board is somewhat broader than simply advisory. The General Counsel decides
whether to begin an investigation into suspected violations and
whether to recommend sanctions to the Board. The state Supreme
Court acts only upon recommendation from the Board, although it is
free to disagree.
Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Canon 4 permits a judge to participate in the public debate "if in
doing so he does not cast doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue
that may come before him." Code of Judicial Conduct, 204 PA. CODE ch. 33,
Canon 4 (1979).
89. See Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144.
90. Id. (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)); see also United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571 (1973)
("[O]ur task is not to destroy the [Hatchl Act if we can, but to construe it, if
consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional
limitations.").
91. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144 (citing Laudenberger v. Port Auth., 536 A.2d
147 (Pa. 1981), appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 940 (1982)).
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essarily curtail protected speech, but does serve a compelling state interest."' 92 Therefore, the Third Circuit vacated the district court's
93
injunction against the Canon's enforcement.
The Third Circuit also considered plaintiff's constitutional challenge to Canon 7(B)(2) of the Judicial Code, which prohibits judicial
candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions. 94 The
court held that the provision was constitutional, because it was narrowly
tailored to serve the state's interest in preventing the appearance of impropriety arising from direct payment of campaign contributions to
95
those who will be responsible for impartially executing the laws.
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Stretton, the Third Circuit acknowledged that if it did not interpret Canon 7, candidates would be left without guidance as to the ethical administration of their judicial campaigns. 9 6 The court opined that
its decision would remove any vagueness found in the language of the
statute, and thus allow the proper behavior for judicial candidates to
appear with constitutional clarity. 97 This section will examine the Third

92. Id. The Stretton court acknowledged that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court is the ultimate interpreter of the Code ofJudicial Conduct, so that only a
finding by the state supreme court could conclusively settle the meaning of the
challenged provision. Id. at 140; see In re Cunningham, 538 A.2d 473, 476-77
(Pa.) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court must review recommendations ofJudicial Inquiry and Review Board, but may reject them in favor of court's own independent judgment), appeal dismissed sub nom. White v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd.,
488 U.S. 805 (1988). Rejecting the district court's broad reading of the Canon,
the Third Circuit concluded:
[W]e predict that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would read Canon 7(B)(1)(c) to mean that "disputed legal or political issues" refers
only to those issues that are likely to come before the court. Read in
this way the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve the state's compelling interest in an impartial judiciary.
Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144.
93. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144. (finding state's interest sufficiently compelling and Canon 7(B)(1)(c) sufficiently narrowly drawn to overcome plaintiff's

overbreadth challenges).
94. Id. at 145-46.
95. Id. (provision served compelling state interest by narrowly tailored
means and alternative methods of raising funds were available to plaintiff). For
a discussion of the Stretton court's evaluation of Canon 7(B)(2), see supra notes
63-66 and accompanying text.
96. See Stretton, 944 F.2d at 141. The court recognized that Canon
7(B)(1)(c) was likely to have a chilling effect on the political speech ofjudicial
candidates, because the canon did not specify those issues that would be constitutionally permissible topics for campaign speeches. Id. For a discussion of the
Stretton court's analysis of the chilling effect of Canon 7(B)(1)(c) on political
speech, see supra note 7. For a discussion of the chilling effect of overbroad
legislation on speech, see supra note 25.
97. See Stretton, 944 F.2d at 138, 141 (narrow construction of Canon
7(B)(1)(c) would pass constitutional muster and relieve uncertainty of judicial
candidates).
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Circuit's interpretation of Canon 7 and evaluate the success of the
court's attempt to enunciate a standard for judicial candidates who seek
either to express their views on political and legal topics or to solicit
campaign contributions personally.
In affirming the constitutionality of Canon 7(B)(2), the Third Circuit endorsed Pennsylvania's prohibition of the personal solicitation of
campaign contributions by judicial candidates. 98 Therefore, candidates
must confine themselves to campaign activities expressly permitted by
the Canon in order to remain within its ethical bounds. 9 9 Such activities
include: 1) organizing a committee to solicit funds; 2) submitting
names of potential contributors; 3) reviewing the lists of contributors
and the amounts given to the campaign; 4) sending personal letters of
appreciation; and 5) attending parties to thank campaign contributors.' 0 0 Additionally, candidates must sign public reports that list all
campaign contributions and must obtain certification by state officials
that the campaign committee has not violated the state reporting
laws.' 0 ,
The impact of the Third Circuit's analysis of Canon 7(B)(1)(c) is
more difficult to evaluate. The Stretton court rejected the reasoning of
JC.J.D. and Florida Bar, which had struck down the Code provision, because these courts did not consider the narrow construction used in
Stretton.' 0 2 The court stated that it "believe[d] the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania would also find them unconvincing."1 0 3 The Third Circuit
then cited favorably to Berger in its discussion of the necessity of using a
0 4
narrow, constitutional construction of a statute whenever possible.'
The court noted that Berger recognized the importance of Canon 7 in
preventing political pledges, but refrained from imposing an interpretation that would make the Canon an unconstitutional bar on criticism of
0 5
court administration. '
98. See id. at 146.
99. See id. at 145-46.
100. See id. at 145. The court conceded:
Plaintiff is correct that the currently approved practices do involve the
candidate deeply, albeit indirectly, in the process. Nevertheless, we
cannot say that the state may not draw a line at the point where the
coercive effect, or its appearance, is at its most intense-personal solici-

tation by the candidate.
Id. For a discussion of the importance of avoiding the appearance of a coercive
effect produced by personal solicitation of campaign contributions, see supra
notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
101. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 145.

102. Id. at 143-44. For a discussion ofJ.C.J.D., see supra notes 28-32 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Florida Bar, see supra notes 24-27 and
accompanying text.
103. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144.
104. See id.
105. See id. For a discussion of Berger, see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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The Third Circuit's narrow reading of Canon 7(B)(1)(c) redefined
"disputed legal or political issues," limiting the Canon's prohibition to
discussion of only those topics likely to come before the court.' 0 6 This
construction would allow candidates to discuss matters concerning the
court system itself. Permissible subjects of discussion would include administrative issues, such as changes in the jury selection process and
closer scrutiny of district judges, as well as more politically charged issues, such as the racial and gender composition of the courts. 10 7 This
interpretation would also permit discussion of other, more controversial
topics on the plaintiff's proposed list, such as a candidate's personal
views on privacy, criminal sentencing and burdens of proof.
By accepting the Boards' position that none of the plaintiff's proposed topics offended Canon 7(B)(1)(c), the Third Circuit also approved the discussion of some issues that might indicate how a
candidate will actually perform if he or she is elected. The court agreed
that candidates are permitted to discuss their views on judicial activism
and to explain how they would permit societal changes to affect their
views regarding existing law, as well as to discuss how they would apply
a particular burden of proof. Presumably, the Third Circuit would draw
the line regarding permissible speech where the Berger court drew itforbidding those statements that appear to be particularized pledges of
future conduct.' 0 8 This construction, however, leaves room for a good
faith argument that discussion of a given topic, despite its controversial
nature, will not reveal a bias that threatens the public's perception of
judicial impartiality.

V.

CONCLUSION

The grounding of the Third Circuit's analysis in First Amendment
jurisprudence is likely to reduce the possibility of disagreement by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court should the issue of Canon 7's interpretation arise in the future. The Stretton court clearly delineated the interpretation necessary for compliance with the United States Constitution,
and therefore the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will probably utilize this
construction in order to preserve its Canon 7 provisions. In the case of
Canon 7(B)(1)(c), the proper construction requires that restrictions imposed upon the political speech of judicial candidates extend only to
those issues likely to come before the court, for it is primarily in the
106. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144.
107. The issues mentioned are from the plaintiff's list of proposed topics
for discussion. For the Stretton court's compilation of plaintiff's proposed topics,
see supra note 49.
108. For a discussion of Berger, see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying
text, and text accompanying notes 104-05.
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treatment of those issues that judges may fall prey to challenges of partiality and closed-mindedness.
Kathleen Margaret Sholette
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